How could this have been? This was allegedly the bullet that had entered Abu Akleh’s neck or head and killed her. The statement said that the bullet was “badly damaged”. The second notable thing, however, was much more significant.
Biting the bullet strategy nonidentity full#
This baseless statement was malevolent, created in the full knowledge that this was what would be headlined by the venomous anti-Israel media (whose own deeply tendentious and distorted claims about this have been exposed here, here, here, here and here ). Having reached no definitive conclusion from reading these two inconclusive reports which had failed to establish responsibility, the State Department nevertheless pinned the “likely” responsibility on the IDF. But since neither the PA nor the IDF investigations to which the statement referred had reached any conclusion either, their reports were no more than speculation. The first was that, even though the State Department couldn’t establish who had killed Abu Akleh, it stated it was “most likely” that the IDF was responsible. Two things were notable about this statement.
Biting the bullet strategy nonidentity series#
The USSC found no reason to believe that this was intentional but rather the result of tragic circumstances during an IDF-led military operation against factions of Palestinian Islamic Jihad on May 11, 2022, in Jenin, which followed a series of terrorist attacks in Israel. By summarising both investigations, the USSC concluded that gunfire from IDF positions was likely responsible for the death of Shireen Abu Akleh. In addition to the forensic and ballistic analysis, the USSC was granted full access to both Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinian Authority (PA) investigations over the last several weeks. Ballistic experts determined the bullet was badly damaged, which prevented a clear conclusion. The US State Department said on Monday that it could not reach a definitive conclusion about who was responsible for killing the Palestinian-American journalist, Shireen Abu Akleh, in a firefight between the Israel Defence Forces and Palestinian terrorists in Jenin last May.Īfter an extremely detailed forensic analysis, independent, third-party examiners, as part of a process overseen by the US Security Coordinator (USSC), could not reach a definitive conclusion regarding the origin of the bullet that killed Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. It is equally interested on researches on various, bilateral and multilateral commissions in the continent, including those outside the continent which have relevance for African Union’s integrative efforts.Palestinians honour journalist Shireen Abu Akleh at her funeral The journal welcomes well-researched papers on the African Union and the various Regional Economic Communities in Africa- the Arab Maghreb Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the East African Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Southern African Development Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States etc. The journal is two double-blind reviewed - meaning that each article has two reviewers, and that reviewer and author identities, in each case, are concealed from each other throughout the Review Process. The Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS), a tri-annual, high quality international journal published consistently since 2012, is calling for papers. It outlines how the operational aperture between early warning and early action dwarfs and overlooks the contributions of the Continental Early Warning System to the African Peace and Security Architecture and suggests ways to connect early warning to early action in the Continental Early Warning System. The article contributes to the existing literature fragments by documenting and advancing comprehensively, how the Continental Early Warning System faces a weak structural linkage between early warning, decision-makers, and early action. Secondary data sources and interviews were used to accentuate the above. Data were qualitatively gathered through primary sources such as the African Union reports, communiqués and conference proceedings. Therefore, the overall aim of the article is to extensively examine the reasons behind the early warning and early action dichotomy and suggest operational and structural ways to close the gap. The gap between early warning and early action has been identified in previous studies, but it has not been given full attention and comprehensively discussed. The Continental Early Warning System of the African Union was positioned within the African Peace and Security Architecture as one of its five pillars responsible for generating early warning information for decision-makers.
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